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1. INTRODUCTION
Public enterprises (PEs) may pose significant fiscal risks on
account of their quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs) and contingent
liabilities. QFAs can lead to financial difficulties, unless they
are adequately and transparently compensated by
government budget transfers.
2 Contingent liabilities can arise,
for example, when there is political interference or
mismanagement leading to excessive borrowing and poor
profitability. These liabilities can be explicit, as in the case of
guarantees, or implicit, if there is an expectation or precedent
that PEs in financial distress will be eventually bailed out by
the government.
Good practices in fiscal transparency call for the reporting
on all activities of a fiscal nature and their associated risks.
When PEs undertake QFAs, these operations are not
captured in the conventional measures of the government
fiscal balance, distorting the nature and extent of fiscal
activities. This can lead to poor fiscal policy design and also
creates incentives to move fiscal activities to PEs to make
the reported government fiscal balances appear better than
they actually are. At a minimum, therefore, the operations
of PEs should be systematically monitored and
transparently reported to the public. This requires adequate
frequency and comprehensiveness to allow an assessment of
fiscal risks.
3
In 2005, the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department proposed a
framework to assess fiscal risks from PEs and define the
appropriate coverage of fiscal indicators. Quantifying QFAs
and contingent liabilities can be methodologically
challenging. Thus, identifying in first instance those
enterprises that pose the most significant risks becomes
important. The Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) proposed an
approach to the treatment of PEs in fiscal indicators and
targets, focusing on the fiscal risks posed by the operations of
PEs.
4 The ultimate goal of this work is to assist authorities
and Fund staff in defining the appropriate coverage of
indicators and targets for the analysis of fiscal policy.
Appropriate coverage is essential to allow an adequate,
transparent assessment of the fiscal stance, mitigate incentives
to move fiscal activities off budget, and reduce risks that
unrecorded liabilities materialize unexpectedly.
This paper assesses fiscal risks posed by two key public
transport enterprises in Hungary: the Hungarian State
Railways (MAV) and the Budapest Transport Company
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2 QFAs may be conducted by financial institutions (e.g., subsidized lending; credit ceilings; exchange rate guarantees), or by non-financial public enterprises (e.g.,
charging less than commercial prices; provision of social services; pricing for budget revenue purposes; paying above commercial prices to suppliers). 
3 For instance, the IMF Manual on Fiscal Transparency recommends that budget documents include statements on QFAs and fiscal risks, and that the consolidated
position of the government and non-governmental public sector agencies that undertake significant QFAs be reported. Similarly, the 2001 Government Finance
Statistics Manual (GFSM 2001) recommends the compilation of accrual-based statistics on the operations of PEs and the non-financial public sector.
4 In 2004, FAD conducted several pilot studies to identify “commercially oriented” PEs, which could be considered candidates for exclusion from fiscal targets and
indicators. Very few PEs were found to be commercially oriented. More importantly, the pilot studies also suggested various changes in the approach to the fiscal
coverage of PEs. See IMF (2005) for further details.(BKV). As noted by the IMF Report on Observance of
Standards and Codes, Fiscal Transparency Module (fiscal
ROSC), these PEs undertake QFAs on behalf of the
government. However, annual transfers from the budget
have been ad hoc and insufficient to cover recurring
operating losses. As a consequence, MAV and BKV have
resorted to borrowing, typically with government guarantees,
which has resulted in an accumulation of contingent liabilities
for the government. Since PEs are not covered by fiscal
indicators and targets which apply to the general
government, there are incentives to under-finance QFAs and
report a lower headline fiscal balance until the PEs run into
financial distress and have to be bailed out. In the past, these
bailouts have been treated as “one-off” operations,
hampering fiscal transparency and contributing to
overshooting of fiscal targets. Against this background, this
paper applies FAD’s framework to assess the fiscal risks
posed by MAV and BKV and draws some lessons for
enhancing the transparency, quality and predictability of
fiscal policy in Hungary.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a
brief overview of public sector enterprises in Hungary.
Section 3 applies FAD’s approach to assess the fiscal risks
from MAV and BKV. The final section offers some
concluding remarks. 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN HUNGARY
Key assets remain under government ownership and
operation. Over 85 percent of the economy is in private
hands.
5 According to the Privatization Act (Act XXXIX of
1995), assets may remain in long-term state ownership if they
belong to a national public utility provider or are considered
to be of strategic importance for the national economy or
defence. Capital intensive (MAV, BKV, electricity
production) and labour intensive (Post) enterprises remain as
state property. The Privatization Act also established the
Hungarian Privatization and State Holding Company (ÁPV
Rt.) to oversee the privatization program.
6
There is no centralized oversight and management of PEs.
The organization of ownership rights follows a decentralized
model.
7 This is regulated by the Privatization Act, which
assigns rights and oversight responsibilities between ÁPV Rt.
and line ministries.
8 PEs under the supervision of ÁPV Rt. aim
to maintain an arms-length relationship with the
government.
9 Dividends and transfers between these PEs and
the budget are set in business plans. Arrangements regulating
transfers between PEs under line ministries and the budget
are not transparent. Dividend and transfer policies have been
ad hoc, and QFAs have not been fully compensated by the
government. QFAs are particularly significant in the cases of
MAV and BKV, but are also present in the water, post,
electricity, and gas sectors.
10
Consolidated information on the PE sector is not available.
The Hungarian budget covers the state budget sector,
including central budget institutions, the health and pension
funds, and other funds (e.g., Labour Market Fund; Cultural
Fund). For the purpose of reporting on ESA-95 basis, and
setting targets for the Convergence Programme, the state
budget sector is consolidated with local government
operations and certain central government units outside of
the state budget sector.
11 The government does not report on
the consolidated position of the PE sector, either in budget
documents or within-year reports. Budget documents also
lack information on QFAs. And the discussion on fiscal risks
is limited to loan guarantees of the central government. To
assess the fiscal impulse, the central bank of Hungary
compiles an augmented measure of the fiscal deficit (the
“augmented SNA deficit”) which consolidates the general
government sector with key QFAs, including those from
public transport enterprises.
The operations of MAV and BKV are monitored closely by
the government, but within-year data are not reported to the
public. The Ministry of Economy and Transport (MET)
exercises full ownership rights over MAV, while the
Municipality of Budapest (MB) is the sole shareholder of
BKV. Recognizing that these enterprises are in a difficult
financial situation, their operations are monitored closely by
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5 See Báger and Kovács (2004) for a survey of privatization in Hungary.
6The government recently submitted to Parliament a new Act on State Asset Management, which will set up a state asset management company. This company will
assume the responsibilities currently assigned to the ÁPV Rt., the Treasury Property Directorate, and the National Land Fund.
7 See OECD (2005a) and OECD (2005b) for a survey on ownership function models for PEs.
8 ÁPV Rt. exercises ownership rights over several important public enterprises, including the long-distance bus company VOLANBUSZ and certain power enterprises.
The Ministry of Economy and Transport exercises ownership rights over MAV, the National Road Construction Company, and the State Motorway Company, among
others. The Municipality of Budapest is the sole shareholder of BKV. See Appendix 1 for a full list of enterprises under long-term state property as dictated by the
Privatization Act. 
9 As part of its asset management duties, ÁPV Rt. defines and approves the enterprises’ strategies and business plans, continuously tracks enterprises’ financial
management and liquidity, has enterprises’annual reports compiled, and decides on dividend payments.
10 See fiscal ROSC for further details.
11These include, for example, ÁPV Rt, the National Road Construction Company, and the State Motorway Company. The budget documents include an appendix that
explains the relationship between fiscal targets of the state budget sector and general government consistent with ESA 95.the government. MAV reports to the MET on a monthly
basis; and the amounts of capital injections and state
guarantees are coordinated and approved by the MET and
the Ministry of Finance. BKV also reports to the MB on a
monthly basis. Its borrowing plans are approved by the MB,
and by the state as well in the case of state-guaranteed loans.
These within-year reports are not publicly available, although
audited annual reports are.
3. ASSESSMENT OF FISCAL RISKS
This section reviews fiscal risks posed by MAV and BKV.
Given precedents of financial difficulties and contingent
liabilities, this section assesses the fiscal risks from MAV and
BKV in light of the criteria proposed by FAD. These criteria
relate to: (i) managerial independence; (ii) relations with the
government; (iii) financial conditions; (iv) governance
structure; and (v) other risk factors (Box 1).
Assessment of fiscal risks posed by MAV
1. MAV does not comply with several of the FAD criteria on
fiscal risks. As described in detail below, MAV does not meet
many of the criteria in the areas of managerial independence,
relations with the government, financial conditions, and
other risk factors (Table 1). Regarding governance, MAV
complies with the criteria on external audits, but reporting
could be improved.
Criterion 1: Managerial independence-pricing and
employment policies
MAV does not enjoy managerial independence in
employment and pricing policies. Employment and wage
policies are determined in annual business plans, which have
to be approved by the MET in compliance with the Labour
Code. Passenger tariffs are set by the government, and these
are not fully-aligned with cost-recovery levels. Prices for
freight facilities have been set more freely since 1994 and
better reflect market conditions. As noted by KPMG (2006),
MAV has operated at a loss mainly due to services being
priced at below operating costs and pricing policies being
outside the control of the enterprise.
Criterion 2: Relations with the government-transfers,
subsidies, and QFAs
MAV undertakes significant QFAs on behalf of the
government, but these are not fully compensated by the
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I. Managerial independence
Pricing policy: whether prices are in line with international benchmarks
for traded goods and services; cover costs (for non-traded goods); and
in regulated sectors, whether the tariff-setting regime is compatible
with the long-term sustainability of the PE.
Employment policy: whether this is independent of civil service laws, and
the government intervenes in wage setting and hiring.
II. Relations with the government
Subsidies and transfers: whether the government provides direct or
indirect subsidies and/or explicit or implicit loan guarantees, which go
beyond those given to private enterprises; and whether the PE make
any special transfers to the government.
Quasi-fiscal activities: whether PEs perform uncompensated functions
or absorb costs which are not directly related to their business objective
and/or substitute for government spending.
Regulatory and tax regime: whether PEs are subject to the same
regulations and taxes as private firms.
III. Financial conditions and sustainability
Market access: whether PEs can borrow without a government loan
guarantee.
Less-than-full leveraging: whether PEs’ liability-to-asset ratio is
comparable to industry averages.
Profitability: whether PEs perform compared to relevant industry.
Record of past investments: whether past investments had an
appropriate average rate of return.
IV. Governance structure
Periodic outside audits: whether these are carried out by a reputable
private accounting firm applying international standards and are
published.
Publication of comprehensive annual reports: whether annual reports are
published, and what type of information they include.
Shareholders’ rights: whether minority shareholders’ rights are
protected.
V. Other risk factors
Vulnerability: whether PEs have sizeable contingent liabilities relative to
their operating balance.
Importance: whether PEs are large in some significant dimension (for
example, debt service, employment, customer base).
Box 1: Criteria for Assessing Fiscal Risks of Public Enterprisesbudget. Subsidies or free tickets are provided for several
groups, including students, children, senior citizens,
families, civil servants, pensioners, and others. About 25
percent of passengers do not pay for transport services. The
government makes annual transfers to MAV under two
concepts: consumer price supplements and public service
obligations. These transfers have been insufficient to cover
the cost of QFAs. The share of passenger operating costs
covered by budget transfers has fallen since 2003, from 57
percent to about 47 percent in 2005 (Table 2). MAV also
receives budget support for investment and other goals
(Table 3).
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Public Managerial Independence Government Relations
Enterprise
Pricing Policy Employment Policy Only   No Loan Quasifiscal Standard Tax
Commercial Guarantees Activities? and 
Objectives Regulatory
Prices Subsidies Civil Market Over-staffing Rules
Reflect Servants Wages
Costs
Hungarian  No Yes No Determined Yes; but No Loan Yes; services Yes
State by the decreasing guarantees provided at except for tax 
Railways enterprise exist below (rebate,  and 
and trade  commercial  exemption on 
unions prices and  local
for social  business tax)
purposes
Public  Financial Conditions Governance Structure Other Factors
Enterprise
Creditworthiness Size




3 Listed Audits Reports Rights    liabilities Employees Sales
Protected
Hungarian  Negative 100.8% 6.0% Not listed Yes Yes 100% Hedging, 46,814 131,119
State (2006) state guarantees (2004) million
Railways owned forint (2006)
Table 1
Quasi-fiscal activity (under-financed public services, provision of preferential loans and guarantees) 
with subsequent settlement of debt
Sources: Hungarian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
1 The enterprise has had negative profitability over the last years. In 2006, MAV’s net worth has also been negative, requiring capitalization.
2 Debt level is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets in most recent year in percent.
3 Debt cost is defined as the ratio of accrued 4-year financial costs to average total debt, including short and long-term debt, in percent.
Sources: KPMG (2006); and IMF staff estimates.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Revenues from passenger transport 101.9 114.4 122.0 122.5 121.8 116.1
Budget transfers 63.0 69.5 76.5 80.0 80.1 74.6
Consumer price supplement 16.9 19.3 20.7 22.2 23.6 24.2
Public service obligation  46.1 50.2 55.8 57.8 56.5 50.4
Inflow to cashier from paid fares 38.9 44.9 45.5 42.5 41.7 41.5
Costs from passenger transport 119.9 137.8 151.1 141.1 156.5 159.8
Share of costs covered by:
Budget transfers (in percent) 52.5 50.4 50.6 56.7 51.2 46.7
Inflow to cashier (in percent) 32.4 32.6 30.1 30.1 26.6 26.0
Table 2
Hungarian state railways: Passenger operations, 2000–2005
(In billions of forint; unless otherwise indicated)The tax treatment of MAV is broadly in line with that of
private enterprises. Since MAV does not use public roads, it
receives a rebate from the government on paid excise taxes
on fuel. The same treatment applies to water and air
transportation enterprises. As MAV has been running losses,
it has not paid dividends or corporate income taxes to the
central government. MAV has also not paid the local business
tax collected by municipalities.
12 However, loss-making
private enterprises, which do not provide public services, do
not receive the latter favourable treatment.
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Sources: Hungarian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
1 2006 data excludes freight operations.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1
Public service obligation transfer 46.0 50.2 55.8 57.8 56.5 50.4 74.4
Consumer price transfer 17.0 19.3 20.7 22.2 23.6 24.2 24.3
Investment subsidy 26.0 21.6 27.5 17.2 12.6 18.4 36.5
Fuel tax rebate 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.1 5.7 5.7
Severance compensation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.8 0.8
Budapest Transport Company Alliance  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0
Compensation
Other subsidies 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
Debt takeover 35.7 0.0 121.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
State guarantees 28.7 38.4 24.3 38.7 59.0 131.3 55.0
Total 160.7 136.2 255.9 142.4 158.8 233.1 198.3
In percent of GDP 1.2 0.9 1.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.8
Table 3
Budget support to Hungarian State Railways, 2000-2006
(In billions of forint; unless otherwise indicated)
Sources: Hungarian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
1 2006 data excludes freight operations.
2 Current assets divided by current liabilities.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1
(In percent)
Liabilities/Assets 25.5 73.7 73.7 76.2 82.9 91.4 100.8
Liquidity
2 59.5 57.3 34.2 44.2 42.7 37.2 45.7
(In percent of GDP)
Net operational losses
Before government transfers -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
After government transfers -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
Investment 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
Liabilities 1.2 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.6
Short-term 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.8
Long-term 0.5 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.8
of which: guaranteed 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.2
Debt takeover 0.3 ... 0.7 ... ... ... ...
Share capital increase ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.1
Table 4
Hungarian State Railways: Summary of financial indicators, 2000–2006
12 Act C of 1990 on Local Taxes exempts public service enterprises from the local business tax when these enterprises do not incur corporate tax liabilities.
13 See Appendix 2 for full details on the income statement and balance sheet of MAV.Criterion 3: Financial conditions and sustainability
MAV is in poor financial health. The liability-to-asset ratio
has increased from 25 percent in 2000 to over 100 percent in
2006 (Table 4). The company’s equity and reserve position
has declined significantly over the past 5 years, reaching
below capital adequacy levels in 2004 (KPMG, 2005).
Liquidity indicators also show marked deterioration. Net
operational losses before government transfers were close to
1 percent of GDP in 2006. Investment levels have been
compressed to under 0.5 percent of GDP in recent years.
13
The government provides loan guarantees to MAV and has
taken over MAV’s liabilities in several occasions in the past.
The state took over MAV’s liabilities in 2000 and 2002.
Despite these bailouts, liabilities have remained on the rise,
reaching over 100 percent of assets in 2006. The cost of debt
has been around 6 percent. This is close to government costs,
arguably reflecting the state’s backing of MAV’s liabilities.
State guarantees have averaged 0.3 percent of GDP in the
past 6 years.
The recent separation of freight and passenger branches has
increased transparency. A new and legally-independent firm
for freight transport was established in January 2006. As
noted earlier, prices for freight transport have been better
aligned with market conditions, and freight operations are
expected to post profits following the split in operations
from passenger transport. This separation will increase
transparency and will make it easier to define public
transport services that are to be compensated by the state.
However, unless passenger fares or budget transfers are
increased, losses from passenger operations will continue and
will cease to be cross-subsidized from freight operations.
Following the separation of freight and passenger operations,
MAV will also undergo a rationalization program (e.g.
closure of underutilized branch lines).
14
Criterion 4: Governance structure: External audits and
shareholders’ rights
MAV’s accounts are audited externally on the basis of
International Accounting Standards, and these reports are
available to the public. Currently, the auditor is KPMG
Hungária Kft. (KPMG Hungária Limited Liability Co). Annual
reports are not posted on-line and there is no within-year
reporting on MAV’s financial position. MAV is not listed on
the stock exchange and has no minority shareholders.
Criterion 5: Other risk factors
MAV dominates railway transport in Hungary. MAV faces
little competition in passenger rail transport, serving over
150 million passengers a year. Gyor-Sopron-Ebenfurt Co., a
joint Hungarian-Austrian enterprises, also offers rail
transport services, but on much smaller scale. Five small
private railway enterprises offer freight services. In terms of
employment, the number of employees has declined in recent
years, but with a staff of around 45,000, MAV continues to
be a large employer in need of further restructuring.
Assessment of fiscal risks posed by BKV
BKV also fails to meet many of the FAD criteria on fiscal
risks, including in the areas of managerial independence,
relations with the government, financial conditions, and
other risk factors (Table 5). External audits are performed
and publicly available, and BKV’s annual reports are also
posted on-line.
Criterion 1: Managerial independence-pricing and
employment policies
BKV does not enjoy managerial independence in pricing and
employment policies. Prices are set administratively by the
MB and fall short of cost-recovery levels. Given the current
tariff structure, operating revenues before government
transfers cover less than 50 percent of operating
expenditures.
15 Employment and wage policies are set out in
annual business plans, which have to be approved by the
Budapest Municipal Owners’ and Municipal Operations’
Committees and comply with the Labour Code.
Criterion 2: Relations with the Government-Transfers,
Subsidies, and QFAs
Budget transfers are not sufficient to make up for the cost of
QFAs. Student, pensioners, and other groups receive
discounted or free tickets. BKV receives subsidies to
compensate for these QFAs under two concepts: price
subsidies (linked to consumers) and normative subsides (linked
to public service obligations). Both the central government
budget and the MB provide financial assistance to the company
(Table 6). Budget transfers are determined annually and cover
about 40 percent of operating costs. In 2004, BKV and the MB
signed an 8-year public service contract the defines quality
standards, volume of services, compensation schemes, etc.
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13 See Appendix 2 for full details on the income statement and balance sheet of MAV.
14The OECD (2007) notes that the returns on this programme for 2007 and 2008 are uncertain, and that even with EU funds financing, the level of government support
for this project is estimated to be large. 
15Tariffs would need to increase by 134% to fully finance operations without any budgetary compensation.BKV is broadly subject to the same tax regulations as private
firms. However, as noted below, BKV’s poor liquidity position
prompted the enterprise to apply for deferred tax payments to
the tax authority (APEH) in 2004.
16 As BKV has been running
losses, it has not paid dividends or corporate income taxes.
Similarly to MAV, BKV also does not pay local business tax.
Criterion 3: Financial conditions and sustainability
The government assumed BKV’s liabilities in 2002 and
provided loan guarantees in 2005. The central government
provided special assistance to BKV in 2002, taking over debt
obligations worth HUF 36 billion (about 0.2 percent of
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Public Managerial Independence Government Relations
Enterprise
Pricing Policy Employment Policy Only   No Loan Quasifiscal Standard Tax
Commercial Guarantees Activities? and 
Objectives Regulatory
Prices Subsidies Civil Market Over-staffing Rules
Reflect Servants Wages
Costs
Budapest No Yes No Yes Yes No Loan Yes; services Yes
Transport guarantees provided at (except for
Company exist below on local  




Public  Financial Conditions Governance Structure Other Factors
Enterprise
Creditworthiness Size




3 Listed Audits Reports Rights    liabilities Employees Sales
Protected
Budapest  -12% 28.4% 6.2% Not listed Yes Yes 100% Legal cases 12,745 63,322
Transport (2006) (2006) state related to (2004) million
Company owned damage forint  (2006)
claims 
Table 5
Budapest Transport Company: Summary of compliance with criteria on fiscal risks
Sources: Hungarian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
1 Profitability is defined as the ratio of net profits to net worth in most recent years in percent.
2 Debt level is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets in most recent year in percent.
3 Debt cost is defined as the ratio of accrued 4-year financial costs to average total debt, including short and long-term debt, in percent.
16 A similar situation arose in 2000.
Sources: Hungarian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1
Public service obligation transfer 14.2 14.2 16.2 3.0 8.9 11.9 32.1
Central budget 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 11.9 32.1
Municipal budget 14.2 14.2 16.2 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.0
Consumer price transfer 14.5 15.8 16.8 18.8 18.7 19.0 17.9
Debt takeover 0.0 0.0 37.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Share capital increase 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 3.0 11.9 10.6
State guarantees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0
Total 28.7 30.0 70.4 26.8 30.6 57.8 60.6
In percent of GDP 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
Table 6
Budget Support to Budapest Transport Company, 2000–2006GDP). About 60 percent of these liabilities corresponded to
short-term credits. Reflecting poor liquidity and difficult
access to market financing in 2004 (see below), state loan
guarantees in the amount of HUF 15 billion were provided
for the first time in 2005.
BKV’s financial conditions are weak. Following the
government’s bail-out in 2002, the ratio of total liabilities to
assets continued to increase from 8 percent to close to 30
percent in 2006. Liquidity indicators also worsened (Table
7), rendering the financial position critical in 2004, due in
part to shortfalls in expected price subsidies. At that point,
BKV was granted deferred payments of tax liabilities to
APEH and was authorized to issue new debt. The issuance
was undersubscribed as banks regarded BKV’s
creditworthiness as less favourable compared to previous
years. Net operating losses before transfers were 0.3 percent
of GDP in recent years. Weak financial conditions have
constrained investment at 0.2 percent of GDP, and equity
levels have been on the decline.
Criterion 4: Governance structure: External audits and
shareholders’ rights
BKV’s accounts are audited externally on the basis of
International Accounting Standards, and annual reports are
published on-line. Currently, the auditor is Deloitte &
Touche, and audited reports are publicly available. BKV also
publishes annual reports on its website, with useful and
clearly presented financial information. As in the case of
MAV, there is no public within-year reporting. BKV is not
listed in the stock exchange, has no minority shareholders,
and is not rated by any credit rating agency.
Criterion 5: Other risk factors
BKV is the largest local public transport enterprise in
Hungary. BKV provides transport services to 1.4 billion
passengers a year and does not face meaningful competition.
It employs close to 13,000 people and its orders are
significant in the local input markets.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
MAV and BKV pose important fiscal risks. Both enterprises
fail to meet key FAD criteria. In particular, financial
arrangements with the budget are not transparent and QFAs
are not fully compensated by the government. The
enterprises’ financial conditions have been weak, and despite
bailouts in recent years, liabilities have continued to rise.
Some part of these liabilities are backed by government
guarantees and, in the absence of improvement in financial
conditions, could impact the government accounts in the
near future. Externally audited reports are publicly available,
but the assessment and disclosure of fiscal risks from PEs in
budget documents is lacking. This hampers fiscal
transparency and increases uncertainty regarding the true
extent of fiscal activities. 
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Sources: Hungarian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
1 Current assets divided by current liabilities.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1
(In percent)
Liabilities/Assets 14.8 14.7 8.1 12.7 24.3 29.0 28.4
Liquidity
1 60.9 51.1 103.2 42.3 28.4 36.2 16.7
(In percent of GDP)
Net operational losses
Before government transfers -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
After government transfers -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Investment 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Liabilities 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
Short-term 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Long-term 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Debt takeover ... ... 0.2 ... ... ... ...
Table 7
Hungarian State Railways: Summary of financial indicators, 2000–2006While these PEs pose risks to the government budget,
government policies also entail risks for these PEs. Pricing
policies are set by the government and tariffs have lagged
behind cost-recovery levels. The enterprises’ dependence on
budget transfers poses risks to their operations. Incentives to
under-finance QFAs and bail out the enterprises every few
years will remain, until transparent financial arrangements
between the budget and these enterprises are set out, and
consistent pricing policies are determined.
The government is taking steps to improve transparency and
governance. Over the past few years, the government has
been discussing a public service contract with MAV. In the
2006-10 Convergence Programme, the government
reaffirmed its commitment to increase the transparency of
financial arrangements. The goal is to clearly define the
principles governing operating subsidies in public service
contracts. Under these contracts, subsidies would reflect the
entire cost of efficient delivery of the service that the
government requires the enterprise to undertake. Timely and
proper completion of these contracts is essential to provide
stability and transparency to funding arrangements. The
government also increased budget support to MAV in 2007
and provided a capital injection.
The assessment in this paper suggests that additional efforts
could enhance the quality, transparency and predictability of
fiscal policy in Hungary. Although the general government
balance on an ESA 95 basis is the key fiscal policy indicator
and target, the extent of QFAs in these public transport
enterprises, the history of bail-outs, and incentives to under
finance QFAs, support the view that the existing coverage
does not reflect the true extent of fiscal activities.
17 Best
practices in fiscal transparency suggest that the government
should include an analysis of these PE operations in budget
documents, present a statement on QFAs, and report on the
consolidated position of these PEs with the general
government on a frequent basis. The budget should also
provide a medium-term perspective of financial support to
these PEs. Consideration could also be given to applying the
criteria on fiscal risks to other sectors to identify other loss-
making or vulnerable enterprises which may need closer
monitoring.
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17 As recommended in the fiscal ROSC, a first priority should be to align the coverage of the budget with the ESA 95 definition of government. This requires extending
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Name of company Minimum long-term state holding
Body exercising owner’s rights: Állami Privatizációs és Vagyonkezelõ Rt.
Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó Rt. 25% + 1 vote
MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Tokaj Kereskedõház Rt. 99%
Magyar Villamosmûvek Rt. 99%
Budapest Airport Rt. 25% + 1 vote
CD Hungary Ingatlanforgalmazó és Szolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Balatonfelvidéki Erdõ és Fafeldolgozó Rt. 100%
Délalföldi Erdészeti Rt. 100%
Észak-Magyarországi Erdõgazdasági Rt. 100%
Gemenci Erdõ- és Vadgazdaság Rt. 100%
“Gyulaj” Erdészeti és Vadászati Rt. 100%
Ipoly Erdõ Rt. 100%
Kisalföldi Erdõgazdaság Rt. 100%
Kiskunsági Erdészeti és Faipari Rt. 100%
Mátra-Nyugatbükki Erdõ és Fafeldolgozó Rt. 100%
Mecseki Erdészeti Rt. 100%
Nagykunsági Erdészeti és Faipari Rt. 100%
Nyírségi Erdészeti Rt. 100%
Pilisi Parkerdõgazdaság Rt. 100%
Somogyi Erdészeti és Faipari Rt. 100%
Szombathelyi Erdészeti Rt. 100%
Tanulmányi Erdõgazdaság Rt. 100%
VADEX Mezõföldi Erdõ- és Vadgazdálkodási Rt. 100%
Vértesi Erdészeti és Faipari Rt. 100%
Zalai Erdészeti és Faipari Rt. 100%
TISZAVÍZ Kft. 100%
Hungaropharma Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
PICK Szeged Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Zsolnay Porcelángyár Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
HERZ Szalámigyár Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
KAGE Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Herendi Porcelánmanufaktúra Rt. 25% + 1 vote
Szerencsejáték Rt. 100%
Eximbank Rt. 25% + 1 vote
Name of company Minimum long-term state holding
MEHIB Rt. 25% + 1 vote
Országos Takarékpénztár és Kereskedelmi Bank Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Magyar Posta Rt. 100%
Hitelgarancia Rt. 50% + 1 vote
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Name of company Minimum long-term state holding
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister of Economic Affairs and Transportation
Magyar Államvasutak Rt. 100%
MAVIR Magyar Villamosenergia-ipari Rendszerirányító Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Állami Autópálya Kezelõ Rt. 100%
Gyõr-Sopron-Ebenfurti Vasút Rt. 50% + 1 vote
Közlekedéstudományi Intézet Rt. (KTI Rt.) 50% + 1 vote
Villamosenergia-ipari Kutató Intézet Rt. 50% + 1 vote
ExVÁ Robbanásbiztos Villamos Berendezéseket Vizsgáló Kht. 100%
Magyar Fejlesztési Bank Rt. 100%
Kisvállalkozás-fejlesztõ Pénzügyi Rt. 50%+1 vote
Északdunántúli Gázszolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Középdunántúli Gázszolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Délalföldi Gázszolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Tiszántúli Gázszolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Déldunántúli Gázszolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Paksi Atomerõmû Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Dunamenti Erõmu Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Vértesi Erõmû Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Bakonyi Erõmû Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
PANNONPOWER Energiatermelõ, Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Mátrai Erõmû Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Tiszai Erõmû Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Budapesti Erõmû Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Északdunántúli Áramszolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Dunántúli Áramszolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Délmagyarországi Áramszolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Tiszántúli Áramszolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Északmagyarországi Áramszolgáltató Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Budapesti Elektromos Mûvek Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Országos Villamostávvezeték Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Magyar Befektetési és Kereskedelemfejlesztési Kht. 50%+1 vote
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister of Agriculture and Regional Development
Állattenyésztési Teljesítményvizsgáló Kft. 75%
Érdi Gyümölcs- és Dísznövénytermesztési Kutató-Fejleszto Kht. 100%
Ceglédi Gyümölcstermesztési Kutató-Fejlesztõ Kht. 100%
Fertodi Gyümölcstermesztési Kutató-Fejlesztõ Kht. 100%
Újfehértói Gyümölcstermesztési Kutató-Fejlesztõ Kht. 100%
Konzervipari Kutató és Fejlesztõ és Minoségvizsgáló Kft. 100%
Magyar Tejgazdasági Kísérleti Intézet Kft. 100%
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Name of company Minimum long-term state holding
Országos Húsipari Kutatóintézet Kft. 100%
Zöldségtermesztési Kutató Intézet Rt. 100%
Agroster Besugárzó Rt. 25% + 1 vote
Concordia Közraktár Rt. 100%
ATEV Fehérjefeldolgozó Rt. 25% + 1 vote
Geodéziai és Térképészeti Rt. 25% + 1 vote
Országos Mesterséges Termékenyítõ Rt. 25% + 1 vote
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister of Environmental Protection and Water Management
Hortobágyi Génmegõrzõ Kht. 100%
Hortobágyi Halgazdasági Rt. 100%
Dunamenti Regionális Vízmû Rt. 50% + 1 vote
Dunántúli Regionális Vízmû Rt. 50% + 1 vote
Észak-dunántúli Regionális Vízmû Rt. 50% + 1 vote
Észak-magyarországi Regionális Vízmû Rt. 50% + 1 vote
Tiszamenti Regionális Vízmû Rt. 50% + 1 vote
Vízgazdálkodási Tudományos Kutató Kht. (VITUKI) 50% + 1 vote
Body exercising owner’s right: National Foundation for Employment
Agora Ipari Kft. 100%
Erfo Ipari Kft. 100%
Fõvárosi Kézmûipari Rt. 100%
Fõkefe Ipari Kft. 100%
Savaria Nett-Pack Kft. 100%
Szegedi Fonalfeldolgozó Rt. 100%
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister of Health
Gyógynövénykutató Intézet Rt. 25% + 1 vote
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister of Cultural Heritage
Nemzeti Színház Rt. 100%
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister of Defense
HM ARCOM Kommunikációtechnikai Rt. 50% + 1 vote
HM ARZENÁL Elektromechanikai Rt. 50% + 1 vote
HM CURRUS Gödöllõi Harcjármûtechnika Rt. 50% + 1 vote
HM Elektronikai Igazgatóság Rt. 100%
HM Budapesti Erdõgazdasági Rt. 100%
HM Kaszói Erdõgazdasági Rt. 100%
HM VERGA Veszprémi Erdõgazdasági Rt. 100%
Dunai Repülõgépgyár Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister directing the Prime Minister’s Office
Regionális Fejlesztési Holding Rt. 100%
Magyar Hivatalos Közlönykiadó Kft. 100%
KOPINT DATORG Szervezési és Adatfeldolgozási Rt. 50% + 1 vote
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Name of company Minimum long-term state holding
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister of Finance
Államadósság Kezelõ Központ Rt. 100%
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister of Justice
Országos Fordító és Fordításhitelesítõ Iroda Rt. 50% + 1 vote
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister of Information Technology and Communications
Magyar Távközlési Rt. 1 preference share with prior voting rights
Minister exercising owner’s rights: Minister of Regional Development and Land Use Planning
VÁTI Magyar Regionális Fejlesztési és Urbanisztikai Közhasznú Társaság 100%
Építésügyi Minõségellenörzõ Innovációs Kht. 50% + 1 vote
Body exercising owner’s rights: National Bureau for Sports
Sportlétesítmények Vállalat Rt. 75%
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APPENDIX 2 
Source: Hungarian authorities based on data provided by Hungarian State Railways.
1 2006 data excludes freight operations.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1
Income statement
Sales at purchasers prices 142,717 148,118 150,097 161,752 174,770 183,222 162,520
of which consumer price transfer 16,989 19,302 20,705 22,161 23,597 24,226 24,306
- Indirect taxes on sales 9,832 10,795 9,605 11,824 21,534 23,249 31,321
= Revenues from sales 132,885 137,323 140,492 149,928 153,236 159,973 131,199
- Total employee compensation 89,658 98,611 108,396 117,102 130,426 130,976 124,616
of which social security contributions 24,428 25,909 27,177 28,480 30,939 30,638 28,840
- Purchases of goods & services 38,442 41,095 42,590 42,921 42,261 43,366 48,029
- Services provided by outsiders 50,016 54,683 56,017 56,327 58,157 69,447 56,290
- Depreciation & amortization 17,346 20,377 29,311 31,292 33,313 34,927 34,405
- Misc. fees/taxes  25,377 19,242 17,197 39,531 23,188 30,305 66,873
- Interest payments 5,724 15,167 6,656 5,903 11,061 13,090 21,015
+ Interest earned 5,086 3,840 5,055 3,302 7,177 2,883 6,934
+ Foreign grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
+ Transfers from government 
(public service obligation) 46,048 50,208 55,845 57,815 56,534 50,384 74,407
+ Other income 20,476 28,813 71,888 48,978 32,006 28,228 54,846
= Profit before tax -22,068 -28,991 13,113 -33,053 -49,453 -80,643 -83,842
- Corporate income tax 143 191 29 13 8 0 0
- Dividends paid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
To government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
To others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
= Retained earnings for the period -22,211 -29,182 13,084 -33,066 -49,461 -80,643 -83,842
New investment 62,192 51,898 66,560 74,706 57,859 57,802 68,933
Balance sheet
Current assets 59,201 62,109 59,463 73,929 68,150 81,812 87,168
+ Long-term investments 15,365 16,100 18,788 18,237 16,344 14,497 40,025
+ Fixed & other assets at cost 692,305 738,738 802,388 872,891 925,639 976,414 997,215
- Accumulated depreciation & amort. 125,868 143,717 183,710 214,580 244,249 275,868 273,498
= Total assets 641,003 673,230 696,929 750,477 765,884 796,855 850,910
+ Current liabilities 99,445 108,358 173,838 167,347 159,527 219,817 190,653
+ Long term liabilities 64,246 388,119 339,566 404,629 475,314 508,831 667,381
+ Equity and reserves 477,312 176,753 183,525 178,501 131,043 68,207 -7,124
= Total liabilities & equity 641,003 673,230 696,929 750,477 765,884 796,855 850,910
Financing
Net external 48,875 63,153 7,417 35,213 37,880 54,250 78,873
New loan obligations ... ... 49,289 66,976 62,490 55,035 162,996
Repayment of old loans ... ... 13,061 7,898 7,388 7,115 32,780
Table 9
Hungarian State Railways: Income statement and balance sheet, 2000–2006
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Source: Hungarian authorities.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1
Income statement
Sales at purchases prices
Fare revenue at purchases prices 28,342 30,527 31,389 35,214 40,933 44,729 50,371
Social reimbursement for concessionary fares 
(consumer price transfer) 16,281 17,672 18,814 21,094 21,490 21,902 21,283
Revenue of other activities 2,693 13,417 2,873 4,201 2,547 5,413 2,667
- Indirect taxes on sales 5,073 7,781 5,852 6,785 8,554 9,610 10,999
= Revenues from sales 42,243 53,835 47,224 53,724 56,416 62,434 63,322
- Total employee compensation 29,238 30,790 33,643 36,774 42,035 46,158 51,202
of which social security contributions 8,007 8,081 8,472 9,099 10,261 11,243 12,225
- Purchases of goods and services 23,360 27,754 31,467 35,289 37,470 38,497 40,265
- Services provided by outsiders 531 818 1,419 1,469 1,491 1,894 2,243
- Depreciation and Amortization 10,825 11,192 10,930 11,363 11,594 12,275 13,296
- Misc fees/taxes 40 19 18 15 38 39 29
-Interest payment 1,848 1,918 2,034 700 3,862 4,064 5,054
foreign 428 401 395 71 0 0 0
domestic 1,420 1,517 1,639 629 3,862 4,064 5,054
+ Interest earned 24 137 51 105 5 5 57
+ Foreign grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
+Transfers from governments 
(public service obligation) 14,200 14,692 47,006 5,011 11,508 13,552 39,451
of which subsidies from the Municipality of 
Budapest 13,905 13,905 16,202 3,000 3,000 0 0
+ Other income 5,080 1,200 2,190 1,508 2,723 7,309 3,949
Other expenditure 4,360 6,959 2,855 2,472 3,801 5,682 9,410
Activated own performance 1,796 2,472 2,451 2,705 3,231 2,843 3,024
=Profit before tax -6,859 -7,114 16,556 -25,029 -26,408 -22,466 -11,696
-Corporate income tax 0 0 0 0 0 0
-Dividends paid 0 0 0 0 0 0
To government 0 0 0 0 0 0
To others 0 0 0 0 0 0
= Retained earnings for the period -6,859 -7,114 16,556 -25,029 -26,408 -22,466 -11,696
New investments 14,880 26,667 26,347 21,082 21,688 39,140 74,148
Balance Sheet
+ Current assets 6,980 6,402 19,009 7,408 7,843 10,673 8,025
+ Long term Investments 2,731 2,480 2,319 1,633 1,699 1,153 1,160
+ Fixed and other assets at cost 225,970 244,822 268,299 298,766 320,179 365,003 439,814
- Accumulated depreciation and amortization 46,027 53,059 62,848 73,262 83,709 94,578 105,421
Accrued and deferred assets 84 68 295 294 98 118 111
= Total assets 189,738 200,713 227,074 234,839 246,110 282,369 343,689
+ Current liabilities 11,460 12,520 18,420 17,493 27,664 29,523 47,921
+ Long term liabilities 16,549 16,947 0 12,262 32,256 52,305 49,787
+Equity and reserves 146,930 140,213 156,351 136,589 112,865 102,598 101,568
Accrued and deferred liabilities 14,799 31,033 52,303 68,495 73,325 97,943 144,413
=Total Liabilities and Equity 189,738 200,713 227,074 234,839 246,110 282,369 343,689
Financing
Net external 28,009 29,467 18,420 29,755 59,920 81,828 97,783
New loan obligations 4,202 4,568 25,804 16,542 27,672 22,784 9,932
Repayment of old loans 570 2,965 4,953 6,529 30 3,876 3,770
Table 10
Budapest Transport Company: Income statement and balance sheet, 2000–2006
(In millions of forints)